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Abstract 
The reserve holdings held by the central bank of a country, and more importantly, the changes 
in those holdings as a percentage of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, can indicate a lot 
about the financial health of an economy. In this paper, we examine the cross-sectional 
differences between emerging and advanced economies’ reserve holdings as well as their 
variations over time, around the global financial crisis of 2008. It is apparent that countries 
hold reserves for various reasons, primarily for insurance and to attract future investment, and 
that they are more crucial to emerging economies than developed.
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Introduction 
Reserves are liquid assets held by a bank, company, or government in order to meet 
expected future payments and/or emergency needs (Financial Glossary). Countries hold reserves 
in their central banks to control exchange rates – primarily to keep the rates stable, which in turn, 
improves a government’s economic environment and protects it from volatile currency movements 
(Bedell 2013).   Levels of reserves held by a government and changes in those reserves are watched 
closely by the entire global business community: by institutional and private investors and traders, 
by other governments and by policy makers at home and abroad, to name a few. Why? A country’s 
ability to repay foreign debt and thereby the country’s credit rating can be derived from examining 
its reserve holdings, more specifically, as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
rate at which countries’ reserves change is monitored closely because it is an imperative indicator 
of a country’s currency value, which may lead to speculative attacks  1. Advanced or developed 
countries, generally have more stable currencies and hold their reserves in their home currencies 
and in a mix of the world’s leading currencies, such as the US Dollar, or the Euro or the Japanese 
Yen.  Emerging or less developed countries, on the other hand, tend to not hold any significant 
proportion of their reserves in their own currencies but in more stable currencies, essentially in the 
leading currencies previously mentioned.  These emerging economies are often susceptible to the 
threat of a speculative attack when the value of the local currency depreciates against the currency 
of the reserves.  
1 Speculative attack – hot money flowing in and out of currencies, securities, real estate, and commodities. When 
speculators believe the value of a currency will depreciate, they begin exchanging the currency for another thereby 
furthering the devaluation. Adapted from (Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett n.d.) 
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Economists have been trying to pinpoint an accurate measure of the opportunity cost of 
accumulating reserves since research began in this area. Potential costs include per capita income, 
because capital is scarcer in developing countries which leads to a higher opportunity cost, net 
foreign indebtedness, the government bond yield, and the spread between the government bond 
yield and short-term interest rates (De Beautfort Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). Economies can 
adopt a floating exchange rate which decreases the amount of required reserves (De Beautfort 
Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). Even with less required reserves, they are still costly to hold, 
especially for countries with debt-servicing difficulties. Changes in the international financial 
markets can significantly increase the interest rates countries pay on international borrowing 
(Landell-Mills 1989).  
The rate of reserves held as a percentage of GDP vary according to global economic 
conditions such as changes in trade or investments. The global financial crisis began in the United 
States and Europe in 2007 and spread to most other economies throughout 2008. Unsustainable 
appreciation in real estate markets and overly-accessible credit led to the collapse of the financial 
system. Emerging markets were most negatively impacted through the financial channels, 
specifically through high-leverage and short-term debt, which was further instigated by pegged 
exchange rates (Berkmen, et al. 2012).  Thus, the 2008 global financial crisis changed countries’ 
saving patterns. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) on countries’ reserves and to specifically examine if the impact was different on developed 
countries versus emerging economies.  Using a sample of 46 countries’ annual reserve holdings 
during the period 2003 to 2017, and a simple comparative analysis, this paper finds differences 
between the two groups of countries.    To further observe the effects of the crisis on reserve 
adequacy, this study analyzes reserves held from 2003-2007, 2008-2013, and 2013-2017. 
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Separating the overall sample period into these time segments allows for analysis of the pre-crisis 
period, crisis period, and post-crisis period. Preliminary results show that there is indeed a 
differential impact of the GFC on countries’ reserve holdings: emerging economies saw a 
significant drop in their reserves holdings as a percentage of GDP, post-crisis, compared to 
advanced countries. The greatest disparities in reserve accumulation are found in the cross-cultural 
analyses. Whereas advanced economies’ reserve adequacy stayed constant, or even decreased 
following the crisis, emerging economies rapidly increased reserve holdings as a percent of GDP. 
The differences are especially noted between both advanced and emerging Asian economies vs the 
rest of the continents.  
Literature Review and Context: 
 
Why Do Countries Accumulate Reserves? 
Countries’ demand for reserves are positively and negatively correlated to certain 
economic factors, as described in a World Economic Output report from September 2003. The 
positive factors include economic size, current account vulnerability, and capital account 
vulnerability. On the other hand, exchange rate flexibility and opportunity cost negatively 
correspond (Edison 2003).  For example, when exchange rate depreciation is projected to improve 
the balance-of-payments, the necessity for international reserves is likely to decrease (Shevchuk 
2015). The negative elasticity of the reserve demand was confirmed for 13 industrial countries 
(Bahmani-Oskooee and Niroomand 1998). From a dataset using 100 countries’ reserve 
accumulations from 1975-2004, the determinants of traditional macro variables, financial 
variables, and institutional variables did not hold the same weight of importance among different 
countries (Cheung and Ito 2009).  The traditional macro variables relate to the factors mentioned 
earlier from the World Economic Report that are typically associated with reserve behavior such 
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as imports, volatility of exports, opportunity cost of holding international reserves, and per capita 
GDP (Cheung and Ito 2009). The second category includes money supply, external debts and 
capital flows (Cheung and Ito 2009). Fear of low reserve holdings leads to speculation and furthers 
capital outflows causing an “internal drain” i.e. capital flight by speculators (De Beautfort 
Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). A spike in capital outflows typically leads to the depreciation of 
currency. In that case, monetary authorities can “(1) allow the exchange rate to depreciate, (2) use 
foreign reserves to defend the exchange rate, (3) raise the interest rate in the hope that a higher 
interest rate will discourage capital outflows, (4) impose capital controls, or (5) use a combination 
of all of the above” (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The third category is institutional 
variables which includes corruption, political stability, and capital controls (Cheung and Ito 2009).  
Most countries hold their reserves in the form of low-yielding short-term US Treasury 
securities. This proposes an opportunity cost for countries with different currencies. It also makes 
these emerging economies sensitive to US monetary policy through changing exchange rates 
(Davis, Crowley and Morris 2018).  The Turkish lira, for example, fell from about 1 lira = 0.67 
US Dollars on January 4, 2010 to 1 lira = 0.19 US Dollars on January 2, 2019 (XE Currency 
Converter - Live Rates n.d.). The more this value continues to drop, the more expensive it is for 
the country to finance its debts. The cost also increases due to investors requiring higher yields 
based on the riskiness of lending to countries in crisis. In countries, such as Turkey, which are 
synonymous with political corruption, the required level of reserves is even higher. Less corrupt 
countries traditionally hold a lower level of international reserves because they do not need to 
validate their trustworthiness as much as their more relatively corrupt counterparts do (Aizenman 
and Marion 2002) (Davis, Crowley and Morris 2018).   Therefore, the traditional belief is that 
developing countries with a high level of exposure to external financing should accumulate a 
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strong level of international reserves to protect themselves from financial crises and support the 
value of local currencies (Aizenman, Lee and Rhee 2004).  Contrastingly, there is an alternative 
consideration for capital flows and international reserves. It is argued that emerging market 
economies increase reserve holdings to secure foreign direct investments (FDI) from the most 
developed countries, specifically the US (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2008). This implies 
that the better developing economies perform financially, the more the countries should 
accumulate in international reserves.  
In the case of Asian economies, many of which are on the IMF list of developing nations, 
forex reserves have been soaring since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Out of fear of 
unexpected shortages of foreign exchange and currency crisis paired with distrust of the IMF 
following the Asian crisis, the nations have been holding above-optimal level reserves (Park and 
Estrada 2009). The term “above optimal” refers to the amount suggested by the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule introduced in 1999 for emerging market economies. It recommends that 
developing economies “should have sufficient reserves to cover full amortization for up to one 
year without access to foreign credit” (Greenspan 1999).  Additionally, numerous Asian countries 
participate in extensive trade with other nations. The trade practices make these nations highly 
susceptible to external shocks thereby increasing the level of demanded reserves (Shevchuk 2015).  
What differentiates the 2008 financial crisis from previous crises is how much it effected 
the global economy (unlike the series of crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia, Brazil, etc. in the 1990s). 
Those crises arguably did not significantly affect the economy on a universal scale because when 
the Mexican crises led to increased reserves in Mexico, East Asian reserves were unchanged and 
vice versa (Aizenman and Jaewoo 2007). Yet, after the series of crises, developing economies’ 
foreign reserves increased overall as a form of self-insurance (Vieia 2017).  
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The global financial crisis began in developed countries towards the end of 2007 and then 
spread to emerging economies by mid-late 2008 (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). 
Authorities allowed for either their currency value to depreciate or devalue and also allowed their 
reserves to deplete when capital outflows suddenly increased during the past crises years (per the 
aforementioned monetary policy options). However, data suggests many authorities were obliged 
to do both during the global financial crisis (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The Fed 
implemented a system to provide liquidity to the interbank dollar market in response to this crisis. 
Furthermore, The Fed created the Term Auction Facility to provide funding to US banks and swap 
lines to other central banks (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The funds obtained through 
the swap lines trickled their way down to commercial banks in their respective countries (Fleming 
and Klagge 2010). The same study found a positive relationship, though notably, not causation, 
between countries that used their reserves during the global financial crisis and faster GDP 
recovery (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012).  
Based on previous literature, it is evident that countries could be forced to lower their 
reserves after a crisis due to economic circumstances leading to capital outflows. Contrastingly, 
countries also could take a stance to build up reserves as insurance. Since both are possible, this 
study empirically tests whether advanced economies handle crises differently than emerging 
economies.  
Data and Analysis 
 
The International Monetary Fund, IMF from this point forward, collects data and reports 
financial metrics on nearly all of its 189 member-countries. The organization has classified lists of 
“Advanced Economies” and “Developing Economies”. The graphs and tables in this paper use the 
countries that fall under the IMF’s advanced and developing lists. The IMF placed countries in the 
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advanced group if they fit certain characteristics including “relatively high income levels, well-
developed financial markets, and high degrees of financial intermediation and diversified 
economic structures with rapidly growing service sectors” (Nielsen 2013). As another frame of 
reference for developed/emerging markets, Morgan Stanley Capital International, referred to as 
MSCI from this point forward, categorizes the countries based on openness to foreign ownership, 
ease of capital inflows/outflows, efficiency of the operational framework, market organization, 
market infrastructure, and stability of institutional framework (Barra 2010).  
 
Overview: Complete Sample Period 2003-2017 
 
 
The GDP and the reserve holdings of the selected economies from the IMF Advanced 
Economies and Developing Economies were extracted from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
and from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor, in US Dollars. In a simple calculation, the 
reserve holdings were divided by the GDP of each economy for every year in the data set to arrive 
at the reserves held as a percentage of GDP. It is necessary to state that reserve adequacy levels 
can be equally influenced by an increase in amount of reserves and/or a decrease in GDP. 
However, in this dataset, increases in reserve adequacy as a percentage of GDP were largely 
attributable to a higher dollar amount of reserves. This conclusion is apparent when observing the 
raw data of GDP for each country compared to the amount, in dollars, of reported reserves.  
In Figure 1.1, emerging economies’ reserves/GDP are plotted over the time period 2003-
2017. Reserve adequacy had an average of 19.46% of GDP with an average standard deviation of 
11.75% for the series, as depicted in Figure 1.2.  The developing countries are separated by 
continent to highlight the cross-cultural differences in reserve accumulation behavior. Asia 
remains the highest; however we observe that developing European economies start to increase 
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reserves following the crisis to nearly Asian-levels. China, Thailand, and Malaysia were among 
the highest reserve holders as they have been accumulating above-optimal reserves since the Asian 
Financial Crisis, as mentioned in the earlier section. It is worth highlighting the median of the 
developing economies and separating reserves by continent because the average is skewed to the 
right due to the few countries with extraordinarily high reserve adequacy. It is also worth noting 
the African sector only includes South Africa as that was the only African country to be included 
on IMF’s developing economies list. Figure 1.2 displays the average vs the median for the sample. 
In general, there is a positive trend in reserve accumulation over time.  
Figure 2.1 depicts reserves/GDP for developed economies over 2003-2017. Holdings as a 
percentage had an average of 7.45% of GDP over the series with a standard deviation of 7.92%. 
By separating the developing countries by continent, we observe a significant difference between 
Asia (although only made up of Japan as that is the only Asian country on IMF’s list of advanced 
nations) and the other continents in reserve behavior. In general, Developed Europe’s reserves fell 
over the series and settled around 5% as Developed North America rose from 3% and settled to 
about 4%. Asia began at approximately 21% and increased until falling again to the low 20s. The 
median is also imperative in this dataset as it reflects the general developing economies’ behavior 
more accurately than the average. The median, as depicted in Figure 2.2, sits at 4.53% for the 
period at large.  
When comparing Figures 1.1 and 2.1, the differences in savings patterns among developing 
economies and advanced economies becomes apparent. As expected, reserve proportions for 
developed countries are significantly lower than their developing counterparts. To recap, this is 
because emerging economies need to prove their ability to repay debts more to attract investment 
and to protect the value of the local currency.   
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Based on a paired t-test and a difference of means test, the differences in reserve holdings 
as a percentage of GDP for the advanced economies vs emerging economies was confirmed for 
the period reviewed.  
 
Figure 1.2 Emerging Economies  
Year Mean Holdings Standard Deviation Median 
2003 16.67% 9.03% 15.46% 
2004 17.40% 11.20% 14.97% 
2005 17.25% 10.67% 14.13% 
2006 18.39% 11.62% 14.06% 
2007 20.16% 12.84% 15.32% 
2008 18.07% 11.31% 12.85% 
2009 21.93% 13.57% 14.67% 
2010 21.43% 13.48% 13.06% 
2011 20.30% 12.91% 16.27% 
2012 20.72% 13.02% 15.14% 
2013 19.56% 12.42% 14.51% 
2014 18.47% 11.10% 14.89% 
2015 20.34% 10.72% 16.35% 
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2016 20.84% 10.88% 16.66% 
2017 20.31% 11.45% 16.26% 
Average 19.46% 11.75% 14.97% 
Figure 2.2 Developed Economies 
Year Mean Holdings Standard Deviation Median 
2003 10.67% 11.91% 4.53% 
2004 9.98% 11.26% 3.77 
2005 9.24% 10.45% 4.56% 
2006 9.86% 11.36% 3.84% 
2007 9.37% 11.80% 3.90% 
2008 5.70% 6.21% 3.54% 
2009 6.74% 7.06% 4.54% 
2010 7.06% 7.26% 4.90% 
2011 6.32% 6.17% 4.33% 
2012 6.83% 6.77% 4.32% 
2013 6.44% 6.85% 4.18% 
2014 5.78% 5.71% 4.15% 
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2015 5.69% 5.56% 4.57% 
2016 5.81% 5.02% 5.02% 
2017 6.24% 5.44% 5.24% 
Average 7.45% 7.92% 4.53% 
The Pre-Crisis Period: 2003-2007
Figure 3.1 demonstrates emerging economies’ reserve adequacy over the time series 2003-
2007, referred to as pre-crisis from this point forward. This pre-crisis time however, followed 
shortly after the crises of the 90s. Nearly all participating countries in the highlighted continents 
increased their reserve holdings in this time. The median was 12.85% of GDP in 2003 and rose to 
15.14% of GDP in 2007. Numerous Asian nations i.e. China, Malaysia, and Thailand, experienced 
a currency inflation against the US Dollar in the early 2000s which may have contributed to the 
affordability of accumulating reserves in this time. In 2003, $1 USD was the equivalent of 41.48 
Thai baht. Four years later, $1 USD had deflated to 34.52 baht (International Monetary Fund). The 
increase in reserves strengthened the local currency sparking a cyclical movement of more 
affordable reserve accumulation. Figure 3.2 is the developing economies’ reserve adequacy over 
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the same series. Europe and North American developed countries experienced very little change 
over this series. The outlier, Japan, increased reserve adequacy even though the yen experienced 
volatility ranging from ¥108.19 to ¥117.75 (International Monetary Fund) following the pattern of 
its other Asian counterparts.  
 
The Crisis Period: 2008-2012 
 
The effects of the crisis are immediately recognizable from a macro standpoint as 
represented in Figure 4.1. Slightly unexpectedly, the developed markets experienced a greater loss 
between 2007-2008 as a result than the emerging markets. This could be due to the fact that the 
crisis began in Europe and the United States in 2007 – sparked by extremely accessible credit and 
unsustainable property appreciation – and eventually streamed down to emerging economies in 
2008. Both developed and emerging Europe observed a decrease by approximately 5% during the 
crisis. Emerging Europe was able to recover reserve adequacy in the following year (although 
short-lived and partly explained by a drop in GDP) along with developing Asia, as seen in Figure 
5.1 (World Bank). The advanced economies remained fairly neutral in holdings until the end of 
this time segmented period, represented in Figure 5.2. In terms of exchange rates, the dollar 
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appreciated an average of 12.49% against other currencies (primarily developing economy 
currencies) between the 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 periods (International Monetary Fund). The 
capital flight that took place during the crisis devalued the local currencies of many emerging 
economies. The advanced nations (excluding Japan) kept reserves below a maximum of 8% of 
GDP even after the crisis whereas emerging countries accumulated and maintained reserves above 
11%, although typically much higher (Figure 6.1).  
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The Post-Crisis Period: 2013 – 2017 
 
Disparities in reserve adequacy between emerging market continents minimized in the 
2013 – 2017 time series. Asia’s reserves decreased as developing Europe’s increased – even 
neutralizing in 2016 – as depicted by the graph in Figure 7.1. As the developing economies grew 
more similar in behavior, the difference in percentage of holdings was the second largest of the 
whole time series between advanced economies and developing (15.19% in 2009 and 15.03% in 
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2016) (Figure 4.1).  Developed North American and European reserves experienced virtually no 
change. Japan continued to hold above-optimal levels even reaching about 28.05% in 2015 (Figure 
7.2). This level allowed Japan to surpass the developing Asian economies in holding percentages. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
From the difference in means test and paired T-test, it is evident that the changes in reserve 
holdings as a percentage of GDP for emerging economies and developed economies is statistically 
significant. This provides insight of the saving behavior of these countries. This study is quite 
elementary in terms of data analysis. There is no control factor or other variable factors analyzed 
that could affect reserves as a percentage of GDP (such as political turmoil, domestic economic 
cycles, etc.). A more detailed approach to analyzing exchange rate variations may also lead to a 
better understanding of reserve volatility. However, a wholesome conclusion can be extracted from 
this analysis that provides an opportunity for further, more in-depth research.  
We observe that the previous research in regard to reserves as a form of insurance is still 
applicable to emerging economies post-Global Financial Crisis. It is possible the developed 
economies did not behave the same way because they do need the increased insurance. It is 
apparent that Asian nations are still excessively accumulating reserves since the Asian crisis of the 
90s. The Fed’s post-crisis plan lifted the depressed economies and led the countries to a near-
seamless recovery which lowered the requirement for reserve accumulations.  In times of 
economic turmoil, emerging economies are still obligated to maintain a high percentage of reserves 
whereas developed economies are not – at least they do not behave like they do. Overall, emerging 
economies rose holding percentages from 17.25% in 2003 and ended the series at 20.31% 
Oppositely, developed economies started at 10.67% in 2003 and fell to 6.24% by 2017. Reserve 
holdings as a percentage of GDP remains an imperative indicator to help both understand current 
financial conditions and to forecast financial behavior of varying economies.  
 
16 
Bibliography 
 
Aizenman, Joshua, and Lee Jaewoo. 2007. "International Reserves: Precautionary versus 
Mercantilist Views, Theory and Evidence." Open Economics Review 18 (2): 191-214.  
 
Aizenman, Joshua, and Nancy Marion. 2002. "Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of 
International Credit." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 34 (3): 631-649.  
 
Aizenman, Joshua, Yeonho Lee, and Yeongseop Rhee. 2004. "International Reserves 
Management and Capital Mobility in a Volatile World: Policy Considerations and a Case 
Study of Korea." UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper 569.  
 
Bahmani-Oskooee, Mohsen, and Farhang Niroomand. 1988. "On the Exchange-Rate Elasticity 
of the Demand for International Reserves: Some Evidence from Industrial Countries." 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 124, 161-168.  
 
Barra. 2010. MSCI Market Classification Framework. M.S.C.I.  
 
Bedell, Denise. 2013. "International Reserves of Countries Worldwide." Global Finance 
Magazine.  
 
Berkmen, Pelin, Gaston Gelos, Robert Rennhack, and James Walsh. 2012. "The global financial 
crisis: Explaining cross-country differences in the output impact." Journal of International 
Money and Finance 31 (1): 42-59. 
 
Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Hiro Ito. 2009. "A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis of International 
Reserves" (CESifo Working Paper No. 2654). International Economic Journal 23 (4).  
10.1080/10168730903372208. 
 
Davis, J. Scott, Dan Crowley, and Michael Morris. 2018. "Reserve Adequacy Explains 
Emerging-Market Sensitivity to US Monetary Policy." Economic Letter 13 (9): 1-4.  
 
De Beautfort Wjinholds, J.A.H., and Arie Kapetyn. 2001. "Reserve Adequacy in Emerging 
Market Economies." International Money Fund (143).  
 
Dominguez, Kathryn ME, Yuko Hashimoto, and Takatoshi Ito. 2012. "International Reserves 
and the Global Financial Crisis." Journal of International Economics 88 (2): 388-406.  
 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber. 2008. "Asia, Interest Rates, and the 
Dollar." Deutsche Bank.  
 
Edison, H. 2003. "Are Foreign Reserves in Asia too High?" World Economic Outlook 
(International Monetary Fund).  
 
Eiteman, David, Arthur Stonehill, and Michael Moffett. Multinational Business Finance.  
 
Financial Glossary. S.v. "reserve." Retrieved May 2019 from https://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/reserve 
  
Fleming, M., and N. Klagge. 2010. "The Federal Reserve's Foreign Exchange Swap Lines." 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 16 (4).  
 
Greenspan, Alan. 1999. "Controlling Financial Crisis: International: Currency Reserves and 
Debt." 
 
Landell-Mills, J.M. 1989. "The Demand for International Reserves and Their Opportunity Cost." 
International Monetary Fund.  
 
Nielsen, Lynge. 2013. "How to Classify Based on Their Level of Development." Social 
Indicators Research (Social Indicators Research) 114 (3): 1087-1107.  
 
Park, Donghyun, and Gemma Esther B. Estrada. 2009. "Are Developing Asia's Foreign 
Exchange Reserves Excessive? An Empirical Examination." Asian Development Bank 
Economics Working Paper Series 170.  
 
Paul, James A., and Marianna Quenemoen. 2003. "Fall of the Dollar." Global Policy Forum.  
 
Shaffer, Leslie. 2015. "Malyasia's ringgit takes a wild ride." CNBC, August 3.  
 
Shevchuk, Victor. 2015. "Determinants of the Demand for International Reserves in Ukraine." 
Metody Ilosciowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznvch 16 (2): 102-112.  
 
Vieia, Sergio. 2017. "Global Development Trends at the Turn of the Century." United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.  
 
XE Currency Converter - Live Rates. Accessed April 2019. Xe.com. n.d.  
 
